Chapter Six: The Ontological Argument of Anselm
Argument in the Form of Reductio ad Absurdum
The ontological argument devised by St. Anselm, an eleventh-century Christian theologian and the Archbishop of Canterbury, has excited extensive criticism and rebuttals along the history of western philosophy. The argument proceeds from the concept of God, which Anselm propounds as “something than which nothing greater can be conceived”(aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit)
.
God as the maximally exalted and superior perfection can also be discerned from the statement of Allah Akbar, that is, God is exalted from being described or comprehended, and therefore, He is more perfect than any phenomenon imaginable. Such a contour of God, the bequest of Divine apostles, has also been disseminated in Judeo-Christian theology through the inculcations of the Torah and the Evangel.
Anselm’s argument proceeds from the above concept of God in the form of reductio ad absurdum. In this sort of argument, it is proved that holding the complement(naqīdh)
of the desired conclusion entails absurdity; and thus, the desired conclusion is reached in an indirect manner.
Anselm’s argument can be summed up this way: If “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” does not exist, things, which do exist, would be greater than Him. It is clear, however, that this is self-contradictory and absurd. Therefore, with the negation of God’s nonexistence, given that the negation of contradictories is impossible, the existence of God is proved.
The proof of mutual necessity between nonexistence and not being the maximal perfection is that nonexistence is a defect, and existent things are more perfect than nonexistent things. Therefore, if God is nonexistent, existent entities would be more perfect than Him; and consequently, He is not, as conceived, the maximal perfection.
Gaunilo’s Criticism and its Adduction
This argument was quickly critiqued by Gaunilo of Marmoutier, a monk contemporary to Anselm. He asserted that if Anselm’s argument were cogent, it could indicate things, which surely don’t exist. Using the principles of Anselm’s argument, Gaunilo sets a proof to establish the existence of a maximally perfect island:
For example: it is said that somewhere in the ocean is an island, which, because of the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of discovering what does not exist, is called the lost island. And they say that this island is blessed with an inestimable wealth of all manner of riches and delicacies in greater abundance than is told of the Islands of the Blest; and that having no owner or inhabitant, it is more excellent than all other countries, which are inhabited by mankind, in the abundance with which it is stored.
If some one should tell me that there is such an island, I should easily understand his words, in which there is no difficulty. But suppose if he went on to say, as if by a logical inference: “You can no longer doubt that this island exists somewhere, since you have no doubt that it is in your understanding. And since it is more excellent not to be in the understanding alone, but to exist both in the understanding and in reality, for this reason it must exist. For if it does not exist, any land which really exists will be more excellent than it; and so the island already understood by you to be more excellent will not be more excellent.”
If a man should try to prove to me by such reasoning that this island truly exists, and that its existence should no longer be doubted, either I should believe that he was jesting, or I know not which I ought to regard the greater fool: myself, supposing that I should allow this proof; or him, if he should suppose that he had established with any certainty the existence of this island. For he ought to show first that the hypothetical excellence of this island exists as a real and indubitable fact, and in no wise as any unreal object, or one whose existence is uncertain, in my understanding.
In his Responsio, Anselm refuted this criticism on the grounds that the notion of God, that is, that than which nothing greater can be conceived, includes every perfection(kamāl)
including existence and its necessity. Whereas the maximally perfect island is a finite and contingent phenomenon, the conception of whose nonexistence arises no contradiction.
It is possible, however, to augment the tenability of Gaunilo’s criticism. If we add the concept of existence to the contour of his lost island, that is, conceive a maximally perfect island which exists, the spoof proof will withstand Anselm’s response. Since, although the quiddity of the maximally perfect island is characterized by quidditative contingency, its existence does not have quidditative contingency and is not equidistant towards existence and nonexistence.
An example better than Gaunilo’s lost island is the partner of the Creator(sharīk al-Bārī)
. Sharing all of the Necessary’s attributes, the notion of its nonexistence is contradictory to the notions which are integral his essence. If one applies Anselm’s principles here, the existence of the partner of the Creator would be indubitable, notwithstanding numerous demonstrations(barāhīn)
indicate the impossibility of his existence.
The Fundamental Flaw of Anselm’s Argument
Although Gaunilo’s criticism along with what was put forward in its adduction, establish that Anselm’s argument lacks cogency; they do not illustrate its fallacy. The many western and Muslim scholars who have rejected Anselm’s argument have set forth a variety of criticisms; however, none of them seems to be devoid of questionability.
The critical fallacy of Anselm’s argument arises from his failure to differentiate between the notion(mafhūm)
of existence and its extension(misdāq)
.
The notions of maximal perfection, existence, and necessity, which are included in the notion of God, regardless of having or lacking external extensions(masādīq)
, have their meanings. In other words, the notions of maximal perfection, existence, and necessity - regardless of being true by predication as extension(al-haml al-shā’e‛ al-sinā‛ī)
and being instantiated, or being invalid by the same predication and not being instantiated - do carry their essences and essential parts by predication as essence(al-haml al-awwalī al-dhātī)
, because predication as essence is concerned with concepts, and predication as extension reflects whether a concept has any external extension.
By paying attention to the difference between the notion of existence and its extension, that is, existence by predication as essence and existence by predication as extension, Anselm’s fallacy becomes evident. The concept of “that than which nothing greater can be conceived,” is contradicted, and therefore, absurdity is invited, only if existence is negated from this concept by predication as essence. However, God’s nonexistence in the external world, that is, His lack of existence by predication as extension, does not entail negation of perfection from Him by predication as essence.
Therefore, it has to be established what Anselm means by existence when he says, “If that than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that than which nothing greater can be conceived.” If he means existence by predication as essence, it is a valid assertion. Since, the negation of existence from the concept of God, the most superlative perceivable perfection, is self-contradictory. This, however, does not prove such a concept is instantiated in reality. Nonetheless, if Anselm means existence by predication as extension, that is, existence in reality, then there is no mutual necessity between the negation of existence from God by predication as extension and negation of existence from His concept by predication as essence. Thus, while the concept of the most superlative perceivable perfection carries all of the concepts, which are included in it, and therefore, no contradiction is implied, it may not have any external extension. On this basis, the ontological argument does not indicate that to hold the complement(naqīdh)
of its desired conclusion is reducible to absurdity.
If the concept of the most adequate perfection lacks a real extension, it is not contradictory, since contradictory propositions must have an identical manner of predication. The concept of the most adequate perfection is a concept, which by predication as essence is the most adequate perfection, and by predication as extension, is a mental concept, which exists by the mental mode of existence. Therefore, the absence of its external extension does not make its conception an impossibility. This assertion is supported by the fact that the partner of the Necessary is the partner of the Necessary by predication as essence, and possesses every sanctity and perfection that is proved or assumed for the Necessary. Notwithstanding, he is not instantiated in reality; and as far as reality is concerned, he is the partner of the impossible(mumtane‛)
. If mere conception sufficed to prove the Necessary, His partner, because he is conceivable too, would be provable by another reductio ad absurdum.
In the said argument, absurdity is entailed if the premises had an identical fashion of predication, in other words, if a concept, which, by predication as essence, includes perfection, loses its perfection by the same predication; and a concept, which by predication as extension possesses a perfection(kamāl)
, is devoid of it by the same predication. However, if a concept includes some perfection by predication as essence and is devoid of it by predication as extension, it is not contradictory or absurd.
The difference of predication as essence and predication as extension has gone unnoticed in western philosophy; but Islamic theosophers have outlined it. Making distinction between concept and extension and the two kinds of predication, in addition to illustrating the fallacy of Anselm’s argument, solves many paradoxes that are considered unsolvable. It also helps identify similar fallacies that have occurred in the works of Gnostics.
Failure to Make Distinction between Concept and Extension in the Demonstrations of Gnostics
Throughout the history of Islamic thought, some Gnostics(‛urafā)
who have failed to differentiate between concept and extension have presented a variety of rational arguments for the existence of the Necessary. These arguments are far more expressive and succinct than the argument expounded by Anselm. For example, one of these demonstrations asserts:
Existence qua existence(al-wujūd bi mā hūwa al-wujūd)
does not accept nonexistence.
Something, which does not accept nonexistence, is necessary.
Therefore, existence qua existence is necessary.
The minor premise of this first-figure syllogism is based on the impossibility of conjunction of contradictories; that is, existence’s acceptance of nonexistence equates with conjunction of contradictories. Although this argument proceeds from direct view at reality and existence and therefore proves the Necessary through a shorter route than what Anselm has cruised, because it also fails to make distinction between concept and extension, is untenable.
Since the concept of existence qua existence, does not reconcile with nonexistence by predication as essence, and the Necessary is a reality whose impossibility of nonexistence is by predication as extension, the minor and major premises do not have an identical method of predication and the middle term does not repeat, hence the inconclusiveness of the syllogism.
The affirmation of the absolute existence’s instantiation is dependent on a number of steps that must first be secured. In the first step, the respectivality(al-e‛tebāriyya)
of quiddity and principality(al-asāla)
of existence must be proved, because, the proponents of principality of quiddity do not consider reality to be anything except diverse and multiple quiddities. The abstract notion of existence, according to them, is prescinded from quiddities and has developed into an absolute notion through the mental activities.
In the second step, the heterogeneous multiplicity(al-kathra al-tabāyunī)
of existence must be rejected, because if one should maintain principality of existence and adhere to heterogeneous multiplicity of beings, then for him, external entities are diverse realities, which are heterogeneous from one another. From such perspective, each entity is peculiar to its own conditions and limitations and exists only within these boundaries. Therefore, their existence is marked by essential necessity(al-dharūra al-dhātiyya)
, that is, they are existent as long as their essences exist. From this perspective as well, the absolute and infinite existence, which is existence qua existence, is not instantiated in reality, since according to the heterogeneity(tabāyun)
of the beings, existence qua existence is the very heterogeneous multiplicity, which does not have any unity(wahda)
except for the mere notional unity(al-wahda al-mafhūmiyya)
- that even if the dispute of the possibility of such notional unity with the given extensional heterogeneity were laid aside - which only exists in the mind.
In the third step the opinion of homonymy(al-ishterāk al-lafdhī)
of existence, which suggests the respectivality of existence in the contingents and its principality in the Necessary, must be evaluated.
In the fourth step, gradational multiplicity(al-kathra al-tashkīkī)
of existence must be analyzed and its meticulous details elaborated. Since from the perspective of gradational multiplicity of existence, though proved, the Necessary, as the cause of other beings, is at the top of the gradational series of existence. It is not the extension of the unconditional existence, which is the infinite and most supreme conceivable perfection. Since, existence qua existence, according to gradational multiplicity of existence, is a real multiplicity, which is associated with real unity(wahda)
. Obviously, such a reality cannot be the Necessary, since it includes the Necessary as well as the contingents.
In the light of this, on the sole grounds that the notion of absolute existence is absolute existence by predication as essence, and not nonexistence, its real instantiation(al-misdāq al-wāqi‛ī)
cannot be established. The affirmation of its external extension is contingent on establishing other proofs and invalidating views which challenge the Gnostics’ claims.
A demonstration, which proves the extension of absolute existence, can be organized by meticulous analysis of the meanings of dependence and impoverishment; and its explication can be rendered in the context of the splendors of the Origin. Another way is the analysis of causality of the Origin and the comprehension of His absoluteness(itlāq)
and expanse(si‛a)
. In the discussions of causation, Sadr al-Muta’allihīn, after traversing these phases, says that this amounts to the conclusion of philosophy and its consolidation into ‛irfan - and he thanks the Exalted God in gratitude of this profound cognitive revolution.
The Evaluation of Kant’s Tripartite Criticism of Anselm’s Argument
Though Anselm’s argument has excited extensive criticisms by many western and Muslim thinkers, however, not all such criticisms are cogent. Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, delivers three criticisms against Anselm’s ontological argument, which are considered noteworthy.
His first criticism claims the unintelligibility of the necessary existence.
This criticism is, nevertheless, unjustified. Because despite the fact that the extension of the Necessary is in extreme incognito, its pertinent concepts are axiomatic and unambiguous. Although an entity, whose existence is necessary and not conditional, does not have a categorical or quidditative essence, the notion of necessary existence is comprised of some general concepts, comprehension of which - regardless of the fashion of abstracting and discerning them - abundantly clear.
Kant’s second criticism suggests that though because of the logical law of identity, a subject’s essence or essential parts cannot be negated from it, this impossibility of negation holds truth when the subject is existent. However, should the very existence of the subject be rejected, then negation of the essential parts from the subject does not invite contradiction. He says,
If, in an identical proposition, I reject the predicate while retaining the subject, contradiction results; and I therefore say that the former belongs necessarily to the latter. But if we reject subject and predicate alike, there is no contradiction; for nothing is then left that can be contradicted. To posit a triangle, and yet to reject its three angles, is self-contradictory; but there is no contradiction in rejecting the triangle together with its three angles. The same holds true of the concept of an absolutely necessary being [a notion purported by Anselm]. If its existence is rejected, we reject the thing itself with all its predicates; and no question of contradiction can then arise. There is nothing outside it that would then be contradicted, since the necessity of the thing is not supposed to be derived from anything external; nor is there anything internal that would be contradicted, since in rejecting the thing itself we have at the same time rejected all its internal properties. “God is omnipotent” is a necessary judgment. The omnipotence cannot be rejected if we posit a Deity, that is, an infinite being; for the two concepts are identical. But if we say, “There is no God”, neither the omnipotence nor any other of its predicates is given; they are one and all rejected together with the subject, and there is therefore not the least contradiction in such a judgment.
This criticism is defective as well, because when a given triangle is in the abode of existence, its essence, essential parts, and essential properties are predicated to it by necessity and their negation entails contradiction. However, when the existence of the triangle is denied, the negation of predicates does not indicate contradiction. Rather, in this supposition, the predicates are inevitably negated and such a negative proposition is negative because of the nonexistence of its subject.
Contrary to a triangle or any other quidditative concept, the negation of existence from something in the notion of which existence is included, or existence is its very notion, is self-contradictory. For this reason, it is impossible to constitute a negative proposition that asserts the nonexistence of the subject as such.
Existence can only be negated from such an entity without evoking contradiction if the notion of existence(existence by predication as essence)
and the extension of existence(existence by predication as extension)
were differentiated from one another; and until it is done, Anselm’s argument maintains its tenability. It is by this differentiation that existence by predication as extension can be negated - either because of the nonexistence of the predicate or the nonexistence of the subject - from a subject, which, by predication as essence, includes existence as its integral part. However, existence can never be negated by predication as essence from a subject, which includes existence as its integral part.
Therefore, if the two kinds of predication are not differentiated, the cogency of Anselm’s argument remains intact; and when the differentiation is made, his fallacy, stemming from his failure to make a distinction between concept and extension, becomes evident.
Some other authors have tried to undermine Kant’s second criticism on the grounds of difference between eternal and essential necessities(al-dharūra al-azaliyya wa al-dharūra al-dhātiyya)
. They have argued that the Necessary has eternal necessity; therefore, it is impossible to negate Him in any condition and circumstance; and finite entities have essential necessity - hence, their negation is permissible in certain conditions.
Though essential and eternal necessities are different from one another, recognition of their difference does not efface Kant’s reservation. These two necessities, in fact, pertain to two kinds of extension, which are perceivable for the notion of existence. If the external reality of existence, that is, the instantiation of the notion of existence, is finite, it has essential necessity; and if it is infinite, it has eternal necessity. Concepts are characterized with essential or eternal necessity qua their narration of their extensions(masādīq)
, that is, their predication as extensions.
The absurdity which Anselm intends to derive from the nonexistence of the most adequate perceivable perfection, and from which he concludes the existence of the Deity, proceeds from the impossibility of negation of existence from the notion of God. This impossibility, however, which is on the basis of predication as essence, can be presumed to be the case only if predication as essence is confused with predication as extension. And if confusion between the two sorts of predication is avoided, and existence and its necessity is negated from God by predication as extension, no contradiction will be involved, as it cannot be ruled out that the notion of existence, and even the notion of absolute existence - the extension of which, if existent, would have eternal necessity, and from which the notion of existence would be abstracted irrespective of any aspect of conditionality or causation(al-haithiyya al-taqyīdiyya wa al-haithiyya al-‛illiyya)
, but rather by mere entertainment of its absoluteness(al-haithiyya al-itlāqiyya)
- are not instantiated.
The mere mental existence(al-wujūd al-dhehnī)
of the notion of absolute and infinite existence does not indicate that it has an external extension also. Since it can also be attained through the observation of particular and finite beings and their combination(tarkīb)
with other concepts. For instance, existence can be derived through the observation of particular beings, infinitude through the entertainment of their finitude, and negation by consideration of examples where negation is apparent. Finally, by combining these concepts, the concept of infinite existence can be entertained. Another way of abstracting it is to first derive, by observation of particular entities, the concept of a conditional and finite being, and then to abstract from it the concept of absolute and infinite existence. Thus, the mere conception of the notion of absolute existence is not a proof of its abstraction from an extension, which has eternal necessity.
Kant’s third criticism with relation to Anselm’s argument stems from his philosophical perspective on the question of predication. His second criticism is posed without challenging the possibility of predicative meaning of existence. However, in this criticism, he questions whether existence can be a real predicate.
Kant divides propositions into two types: analytic and synthetic. The predicates of analytic propositions, he maintains, are included in the essences of their subjects; and synthetic propositions are propositions whose predicates are concepts that are not included in their subjects.
Islamic philosophers, however, have a different division of propositions, which must not be confused with the above division. They divide propositions on the basis of their predicates into a variety of categories. One of their divisions is the division of propositions into analytic(al-tahlīlī)
and incorporative(al-indhimāmī)
propositions. The Divine sage al-Sabzawārī points out the difference of the predicates of the two types of propositions in this way:
A predicate abstracted from the essence of a subject
Differs from a predicate which is an external associate
The predicates of analytic propositions are called al-khārij al-mahmūl, that is, the predicates which are extracted from the essence of a subject. They are also called al-mahmūl min samīmihi, that is, predicates abstracted from the context of a subject. This category of predicates is in contrast with al-mahmūl bi al-dhamīma, that is, the predicate by incorporation, a predicate whose abstraction from the subject requires the attachment of an external reality to the reality of its subject.
Al-khārij al-mahmūl, in the above meaning, is broader than Kant’s analytic predicates. In addition to the essence and essential parts of a given subject, it also encompasses notions that are abstracted through the entertainment of the subject’s essence. The main characteristic of such predicates, like the notions of unity, particularity, existence, and causality, is that they do not have any extension other than the extension of their subject.
For instance, it is obvious that unity(wahda)
, particularity, existence, causality, and the like, are notions whose meanings are different from the quiddities to which they are predicated. However, for an entity to be characterized by these concepts, it does not need an extension and reality other than its own extension and reality. For example, although the concept of causality(al-‛illiyya)
is other than quiddity of the agency, which is the cause, nonetheless, causality does not have an extension other than the extension of that essence.
Although a thing may not exist, lack particularity, and not be characterized with causality - and to determine these things, to say, whether a thing has existence, particularity, and causality requires proof - nevertheless, even before these are affirmed, the mind is aware that their affirmation does not require the existence of three distinct entities that are incorporated into one another. If the extension and reality of a notion such as unity, existence, particularity, or causality, were other than the extension and reality of the entity which is characterized by it, it would invite infinite repetition and regress; and according to the principle delivered by Shaykh al-Ishrāq in this context, its existence would be impossible.
Al-mahmūl bi al-dhamīma, in contrast, is a predicate whose validity of predication to its subject is contingent on the existence of an extension exclusive to the predicate and at the mean time in unity, or one may say attached or associated, with the subject. For instance, when a particular physique has a certain color or size - since color is of the category of quality and size is of the category of quantity, and the real extensions(masādīq)
of quality and quantity cannot be identical with the real extension of a substance - the extensions of these accidents are inevitably incorporated and united with that physique.
If, though it is not the case, Kant’s division of propositions into analytic and synthetic were on the grounds of unity and oneness of predicate and subject in terms of extension and reality, then indeed, existence does not qualify to be the predicate of a synthetic proposition and can only be a predicate of an analytic proposition. Kant’s division, however, revolves around the axis of notional unity and oneness of predicates and subjects. Although the notion of existence has extensional unity(al-wahda al-misdāqiyya)
with the notions of various quiddities and secondary intelligibles(al-ma‛qūlāt al-thāniyya)
such as unity, multiplicity, and causality, nonetheless, their notions are not identical. Therefore, whenever existence is predicated to anyone of these notions, the proposition is a synthetic proposition; that is, the predicate is not included in the subject. But if the subject that existence is predicated to were not a quidditative concept and were instead a concept that is not different from the concept of existence - and therefore, it were the very concept of existence, or a compound concept that includes the concept of existence - the predication of the concept of existence to the subject would be analytic; that is, the predicate would be included in the essence of the subject.
It was imperative to present this prologue so the many confusions and shortcomings of Kant’s analysis of predication that have continued in the works of his heirs, such as Russell, can be illustrated.
In his third criticism, Kant holds that existence is a copulative being(al-wūjud al-rābit)
, that is, it bears the meaning of a “transitive is”(kāna al-nāqisa)
, and its usage is exclusive to connecting predicates and subjects. He maintains that by placing the predicate on the side of the subject, the mind expresses “is,” which is the relationship between subject and the predicate, as “existent”(al-maujūd)
. Therefore, the concept of existence does not add anything to the subject and predicate of the previous proposition in which it conjoins the two.
Kant substantiates his claim by the fact that there is no difference between a real one hundred dollars the existence of which is related and an imaginary one hundred dollars the existence of which is not related. Since if there were any difference between the real and imaginary hundred dollars - that is, if the addition of the concept of existence to the concept of one hundred dollars added something to its value - then the concept of hundred dollars would not have any indication with regard to the real one hundred dollars and the real one hundred dollars would not be the extension of one hundred dollars. The conclusion he derives from this analogy is that existence is not a predicate, which can be used to constitute a synthetic proposition.
This argument, however, fails to indicate more than the fact that when existence is predicated to a subject, existence does not constitute a reality other than reality of the subjects to which it is predicated. In other words, Kant’s argument only indicates that when existence is predicated to a certain subject, it cannot be al-mahmūl bi al-dhamīma, since it cannot have an extension other than the extension of the subject to which it is predicated. For this reason, the said argument fails to demonstrate that existence does not add meaning to the proposition and that a proposition, which includes the predication of existence to a subject is not synthetic. Therefore, it does not follow that predication of existence is meaningless.
Existence is one of the common and axiomatic notions. The arguments of synonymy of existence(al-eshterāk al-ma‛nawī lil-wujūd)
prove that, regardless of its usage as “transitive is”(kāna al-nāqisa)
or “intransitive is”(kāna al-thāmma)
, existence always has a single meaning. As far as Kant’s argument for the negation of its predicative meaning is concerned, it only indicates that existence does not have any external factuality other than the factuality of the quiddity, which is instantiated through it.
Existence, regardless of the discussions of principality of existence, has a specific notion; and this notion, regardless of whether it has an extension and how its extension or extensions are recognized, by predication as essence, is necessarily itself. For this reason, predication of existence to itself or a subject, which comprises it, constitutes a proposition which, by predication as essence, is necessarily veridical. Therefore, Kant’s third criticism, contrary to what some Muslim thinkers have presumed,
does not undermine the validity of Anselm’s predication of existence to a notion which comprises existence. Rather, Anselm’s fallacy lies in his failure to discriminate between predication as essence and predication as extension, because of which he ascribes the necessity, which is valid with respect to the notion of the most adequate conceivable perfection to its extension.
Addendum
The tenability of the so-called ontological argument of Anselm cannot be restored by the unity of mind and reality by saying that since mind and reality are one, hence, what is conceived in the mind is nothing but factual reality. That is because first of all, the unity of mind and reality has no rational foundation, for there are numerous examples - such as the concept of the Deity’s partner or the concept of multiplicity of deities - that are sufficient to indicate its incoherence. Second, Anselm does not hold such a position and a theistic argument cannot be established on such shaky grounds.
Another point, which should be established, is that the existence of Platonic archetypes(arbāb al-anwā‛)
cannot adduce the putative ontological argument, either. For instance, it could possibly be suggested that mental exemplification(al-tamāthul al-dhehnī)
emanates from the external world and if there were not a factual reality for every mental image, there would no mental image. Since the mental image of “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” is in our minds, it indicates that there is an external reality, which conforms to this concept.
This is unjustified because although Platonic archetypes are real - that is, though external things, in addition their physical existence in the natural world and intermediate existence in mundus imaginalis(‛ālam al-khiyāl)
, have another existence in the world of intellects such that when the soul finds the ability to discern intellectual universals(al-kulliyyāt al-‛aqliyya)
, it ascends to the transcendent stage of their company - mere conception of a few related concepts does not positively indicate that they have been derived from a single and sheer(basīt)
incorporeal reality. It cannot be ruled out that due to the influence of certain faculties of the soul with the capacity to analyze and connect mental notions and images, numerous concepts that have been abstracted from various beings or have been attained by their observation, have been connected to one another and put as “that than which nothing greater can be conceived.” Therefore, in order to make sure that the faculties of estimation and imagination are not interfering with ones comprehension, it is imperative to assess the truth of one’s understandings with the demonstrative reason, which relies only on primary and self-evident concepts and notions.
0%
Author: Ayatullah Jawadi Amuli
