Alhassanain(p) Network for Heritage and Islamic Thought

Alhassanain (p) Network for Islamic Heritage and Thought

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE JAMAAT-e-ISLAMI IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

Mujtaba Isani

Marquette University

Mawdudi is reported to have said “When historians would write of the Jamaat they will say it was anothertajdid movement that rose and fell” (Nasr 1996, 45). Despite half-a-century of its existence, the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan is at bay. Its mixed record includes survival in the face of state repression and some impact on political decision making, but a general failure in the attempt to capture power avowedly for the Islamization of Pakistan. A brainchild of the great Maulana Abu A’la Mawdudi, the Jamaat was a social movement of immense potential, but neither was it able to reach its goal nor was it able follow the plan Mawdudi laid down for it.

[Mawdudi (1903-1979) was a Sunni Pakistani journalist theologian and a Muslim revivalist leader and Islamist thinker. He founded Jamaat-e-Islami in 1941. Ed.]

www.alhassanain.org/english

Table of Contents

Introduction: 3

Mawdudi’s Masterframe: 4

The Jamaat, a Social Movement? And Review of Social Movement Theory: 6

The Jamaat-e-Islami Through the Years: 9

The Beginnings: 9

The Pakistan Movement and the Jamaat (1941-47): 9

Ayub and Yahya 1958-71 and the Elections of 1970: 14

The Bhutto Socialist Years 1971-77: 16

The Zia Years 1977-88: 17

Why Wasn’t the Jamaat Successful? 20

Conclusion: 23

References: 25

Introduction:

Mawdudi is reported to have said “When historians would write of the Jamaat they will say it was anothertajdid movement that rose and fell” (Nasr 1996, 45). Despite half-a-century of its existence, the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan is at bay. Its mixed record includes survival in the face of state repression and some impact on political decision making, but a general failure in the attempt to capture power avowedly for the Islamization of Pakistan. A brainchild of the great Maulana Abu A’la Mawdudi, the Jamaat was a social movement of immense potential, but neither was it able to reach its goal nor was it able follow the plan Mawdudi laid down for it. In the process, though, Maulana Mawdudi was to leave a legacy that has shaped political Islam as we know it today.

The Mawlana authored nearly 120 books and pamphlets, made around 1000 speeches and wrote, theTahfim-ul-Quran, a practical and political explanation of the Quran. The ideology he created affected the principal leaders and practitioners of political Islam in the modern world. The historian Philip Jenkins documents that Sayyid al Qutb and Hasan al-Banna borrowed Mawdudi’s ideas and applied it to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Ayatollah Khomeini not only had personal contacts with Mawdudi, but also translated some of his works in Farsi. The Palestinian jurist, Abdullah Azzam, who was instrumental in garnering ideological support for the Afghan war in the Arab world and a teacher of Osama bin Laden, is also known to be deeply influenced by Mawdudi.

The failure of the Jamaat is all the more glaring because it happens in Pakistan, a country where Islam provides guidance for and regulates every aspect of life and occupies centre stage in the social, economic and political life of all Pakistanis. Admittedly, though the vague but tenaciously held beliefs of the inarticulate, illiterate average Muslim differs from the Islam of the educated, urban and non-practicing Muslims, the imprint of Islam nonetheless is clearly visible. Why has the Jamaat reached this impasse? What strategy did it follow in its aim of Islamizing the government and politics of Pakistan? Has it been consistent in pursuing the strategy it adopted to transform Pakistan into an Islamic political system? How did the Jamaat interact with successive regimes in Pakistan and with what results? Can the Jamaat be regarded as a social movement? Can social movementtheory account for the Jamaat’s failure?

The paper will attempt to answer the preceding questions by: first, looking at the Jamaat ideology and initial strategy; second, it will try to analyze how social movement theory could apply to the Jamaat, then review social movement theory to provide a framework for the analysis; third, the paper would summarize the Jamaat’s interaction with the state from the years 1941-88; fourth, it will use social movement theory to reason for the Jamaat’s failure. In all, the paper will trace the performance of the Jamaat from 1941-88 in the light of social movement theory.

To provide evidence for my case, the paper would use the translated versions of Mawdudi’s original texts by Prof. Khurshid Ahmed; Mawdudi’s biographies written by his most credible biographers, Syed Vali Reza Nasr, Syed Asad Gilani, Khurram Murad and Prof. Khurshid Ahmed; the results of 1970 election which were the only fair national elections held in Pakistan in the period from 1941-88; the Pakistani constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973, and the Objectives Resolution of 1949; and finally, other books written on the Jamaat-e-Islami.

Mawdudi’s Masterframe:

The Jamaat-e-Islami ideology was based on the all-encompassing nature of Islam and the concept of ‘Tajdid’. In the words of Sayyid Abu A’la Mawdudi “Islam is a universal and comprehensive way of life; it is a well-ordered system, a consistent whole with set answers to all problems. Its fundamental postulate istawhid, the unity and sovereignty of Allah. The scheme of life envisaged by Islam is known as shariah and is established on the bedrock of faith. It is on that foundation that the edifice of the moral, social, political and economic system is created. The ideal Islamic society consists of people who, through putting their faith in Islam, have liberated themselves from all allegiances except to Allah; such a society is free and ‘theo-democratic’ ” (Mawdudi 1960, 5). Mawdudi reasoned that an Islamic state is not one which is ruled by people rather the people are vicegerents of Allah; they are ruling with His permission and under His dominion. Thus, no law can be made in the state that is repugnant to the Quran and Sunnah( the recorded sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad).

Mawdudi saw history as a constant struggle between Islam and the ‘Jahilliyah’, which he defined as “all world views and systems of thought, belief and action which deny God’s sovereignty and the authority for Divine guidance” (Mawdudi 1976, 10). He saw deterioration of the religion of Islam not only in the sub-continent but all over the world. In his overview of the history of Islam, he pointed out the struggles that earlier Muslims faced against tyrannical authority and reform movements carried to fight the oppressors. He felt that especially after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Muslims were facing a dearth in leadership and subjugation by the Jahilliyah. Hence, it was time for ‘Tajdid’, which is “an effort to re-establsih Islam in its pristine purity and to reconstruct the fabric of life and society in given space-time context in accordance with Islamic values and principles” (Mawdudi 1960, 12). For ‘Tajdid’, there was to be movement to carry out the revitalization and for him this was the very purpose of the Jamaat-e-Islami. ‘Tajdid’ also meant that there had to be a ‘mujtadid’ or reformer, who would lead in carrying out these reforms.

How was the reform process to be carried out? Mawdudi laid the structure of the reform plan in his book “The Process of Islamic Revolution”. Holding Prophet Muhammad as the revolutionary paradigm, Mawdudi discerned three phases in the prophetic revolutionary movement. First, the Prophet called to faith,to build a strong structure on solid foundations. Second, he organized all those who responded to the call of Islam on one platform, training them to believe in and practice the Islamic way of life, and prepare a strong public opinion which fosters good and inhibits evil. The final stage of the movement began in Medina, where a mere 400 workers, fully trained in Islamic principles and able to act as true Muslims, were called upon to take the responsibility of administering an Islamic political system and organize various aspects of social life on Islamic principles. They presented such a shining example of Islamic government that within a span of eight years the whole of Arabia heartily responded to the revolutionary call of Islam.

Therefore, according to the original plan, the Jamaat-e-Islami was to identify, select and organize those who responded to the revolutionary call on one common platform, and to devise a program for their moral, intellectual and social upliftment in such a way that they become permeated with the true spirit of Islam. Mawdudi, first, emphasized the need for creating a small, informed, dedicated and disciplined group who would provide the leadership to the community through precepts and examples and achieve the objectives of the Islamic revolution. Then, it would be time to start an all-out campaign for the regeneration and the reconstruction of the collective life of the community along Islamic concepts of life.

This program of social reconstruction would be comprehensive and would consist of the change the heart and soul of the individual. This campaign had to be arranged tactfully so that it developed a group of pious men in every locality who are in a position to suppress the sinful elements of the society and can strive to make the people of their own area religious and honest. As a result, popular opinion would emerge in the country which would suppress all kinds of evil and allow a just, balanced society for the service of Islam. It is only after this that Jamaat would try to capture the state and reform the government. The Jamaat-e-Islami was not supposed to be a movement just for the Muslims of India, but was to transcend all geographical boundaries and encompass the welfare of the whole world and all mankind. Mawdudi believed that the practice of the religion of Islam would ‘naturally’ incur an attraction for the whole ummah and hence, either all Muslims would come and live in this new, utopian Islamic state, or would reform their own state to create an Islamic environment. Thus, he envisaged ‘tajdid’ to begin in the sub-continent and then spread to the whole world.

Mawdudi was blamed by the traditional Islamic scholars of the time for creating a “new community of believers” (Nasr 1996, 110). These scholars were from the most notable sects of Islam prevalent in Pakistan at the time, namely the Deobandi, Barelvi and the Ahl-e-Hadith. Although a few of the young scholars from the aforementioned sects joined Mawdudi in the beginning, the big names like “Manazir Ahsan Gilani, Abdul Majid Daryabadi, Husain Ahmad Madani and Shabbir Uthmani” never endorsed his message (Nasr 1996, 115). They held that Mawdudi was over-emphasizing the concept of ‘Tajdid’ to become ‘Mujtadid’ himself, and not for the general betterment of Islam. ‘Tajdid’ according to them was not an important concept of Islam. Since many the mainstream scholars at the time did not endorse Mawdudi’s ideology, his thought was not promoted widely in religious settings and in mosques.

The Jamaat, a Social Movement? And Review of Social Movement Theory:

A social movement may be defined as “deliberate patterns of contentious actions committed by groups whose members are working toward the same broadly defined goal” (Brannan 2009, 1). The “contentious actions” that Brannan pointes out may arise if conventional methods of action such as voting, petition signing or entry in the political scene have failed or are not open to the group of individuals. In this paper I am attempting to apply social movement theory to the Jamaat-e-Islami. On the one hand the Jamaat, according to the French scholar Frederic Grare, was initially a social movement, then became a pressure group and finally became a political party. This is because he believes that when the Jamaat refrained from recognizing the system of government from the years 1941-47, it was typical of a social movement; when it decided to work with the government to gets its demands implemented it became a pressure group; finally when it decided to take part in electoral politics in 1957 it became a political party. According to his framework, it may only be plausible to apply social movement theory to the first seven years of its existence.

However, my paper would consider the Jamaat as a social movement throughout its years of existence. This is because I am considering the Jamaat in the tradition of the political Islam social movements which have been described by scholars as social movements even if they have taken part in government. For example, although the Hezbollah has taken part in elections as a party, it is still regarded as a social movement by Ziad Munson(2009), Kepel(1993) and other scholars in the field. Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood, though banned in Egypt, has taken part in electoral politics by having part members run as independent candidates in the elections.

The similarity between movements in the traditional political Islam is that they all want to be part of the system to destroy the prevailing system, so that they could align the state with the concept of an Islamic government. We see that in the case of Jamaat, Mawdudi only recognized Pakistan on the condition that it became a model country for Muslims all over the world. When he decided to take part in party politics in 1957, it was not because he aimed to become President of the country; it was because he wanted to establish the Shariah and become a “mujadid” according to his “masterframe”. This was made clear by him in a six-hour long speech he made to party members when he was pushing the Jamaat join electoral politics. In his speech, he stated that when the Jamaat would come in to power it would establish the “iqamat-e-din” or Islamic way of life and a “hukumat-e-illahiyah” or government based on divine pattern (Mawdudi 1956, 2).

It can thus be said that the Jamaat remained a social movement as it never accepted itself to be of the system. Secondly, in the years of my analysis, from 1941-1988 it employed “contentious” actions to spread the movement because the repressive nature of the ruling Pakistani regimes. This was true with the Common Opposition Party Alliance it formed against Ayub Khan, the Nizam-e-Mustafa(The Prophet’s System) Movement against Bhutto and the Movement for Restoration of Democracy(MRD) against Zia. Throughout this time the Jamaat indulged in civil obedience, processions and giving fatwa (religious rulings) against the leaders. Unique as it is only in the Pakistani case, the Jamaat’s capacity to operate as political party, was weak during the years from 1941-88. First, there were the British before independence, then Pakistan was run by an interim government for 11 years until 1958, then Ayub ruled as a military dictator 13 years banning all political parties, next there was Bhutto who emulated the role of a communist dictator for his years in power using secret police to suppress all opposition and lastly, there was another military ruler, the master tactician Zia-ul-Haq, who initially gave the feeling to the Jamaat that they were in power but quickly stripped all authority from them. Thus, it could also be concluded that the Jamaat was nothing but a social movement because it was never allowed to be part of the system in Pakistan.

Since now we have established that the Jamaat can be regarded as a social movement, let us review the social movement theory that reasons for the emergence and success of social movements. The classical model reasons that social movements occur because individuals suffer relative deprivation which causes them to have a disruptive psychological state which in turn leads them to be part of a social movement. According to the resource mobilization model,social movements are primely reliant on the amount of “social resources available to unorganized but aggrieved groups to launch an organized demand for change” (Jenkins and Perrow, 250). The Political Process model claims that social movements are dependent on three factors: “the level of organization within the aggrieved population”, “the collective assessment of the prospective of successful insurgency within the same population and most importantly, “the political alignment of groups within the larger political environment” (McAdam, 40). Another important theory, when analyzing an ideological movement like the Jamaat-e-Islami, is that of “master frames” and their effects on social movement (Benford 1988, 6). A master frame helps “punctuate or single out some existing social condition or aspect of life and define it as unjust, intolerable, and deserving of corrective action” and hence is essential to the ideological basis of the movement (Snow & Benford, 137).

Success of a social movement, according to the classical model, depends on the disparity between the elites and the deprived population. According to the resource mobilization model, it depends on the resources available to the group, and how the group uses its resources all affect the success of the group. “In this view, social movements have no distinct inner logic and are not fundamentally different from institutionalized behavior. Organizations, institutions, pre-existing communication networks, and rational actors are all seen as important resources playing crucial roles in the emergence and outcome of collective action . organizational and institutional structures are argued to be central throughout the entire process of collective action" (Morris 1997, 91 ). If a group is able to obtain needed resources; and is able to use those resources in a positive way, that group will have the highest chance of success. A successful “masterframe” is one which is “elaborate”, “strikes a deep repressive chord”, “has mobilizing potency”, is valid for a long period of time and faces little challenges against competing or replacing master frames.

Under the political process model, success for the group depends on the indigenous strength of the organization, its ability to take advantage of the expanded political opportunities that arise, the communication network that the movement creates, the leaders and the mass base of the movement. An essential condition that McAdam theorizes for the “cognitive liberation” of the movement is that the members of the movement identify with its goals and message, and really think that the movement will turn out to be successful; it is only then that “a large enough group of people” would exist “to facilitate collective protest” (McAdam 1999, 48). In the case of the Jamaat, McAdam’s hypothesis of the importance of a ‘communication network’ for a movement’s success carries great relevance. McAdam notes that “if no networks exist, the aggrieved population is capable of little more than short term, localized, ephemeral outbursts and movements of protest” (McAdam 1999, 44). For the continuation and expansion of a movement it is essential that the established organizations of the aggrieved population constitute a ‘communication network’ or infrastructure (McAdam 1999, 46). Thus, for a continual, persistent, potent and “organized campaign of mass political action” a network should exist that can carry the movement through. (McAdam 1999, 44).

1) Hadith Al-Khilafah

Shaykh Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 H) says:

والجواب أن هذا ليس مسندا بل هو مرسل لو ثبت عن عمرو بن ميمون وفيه ألفاظ هي كذب على رسول الله صلى الله عليه و سلم كقوله أما ترضى أن تكون مني بمنزلة هارون من موسى غير أنك لست بنبي لا ينبغي أن أذهب إلا وأنت خليفتي فإن النبي صلى الله عليه و سلم ذهب غير مرة وخليفته على المدينة غير علي

The reply is that this (hadith) is not fully-connected in its chain (musnad). Rather, it is mursal (narrated by a Tabi’i directly from the Prophet), (even) if it is authentically transmitted from ‘Amr b. Maymun. It (also) contains statements that are lies upon the Messenger of Allah such as his statement: “Are you not pleased that you are to me of the status of Harun to Musa, with the exception that you are not a prophet? It is not right that I depart except with you as my khalifah.” Verily, the Prophet, peacebe upon him, departed many times and his khalifah over Madinah was other than ‘Ali (on each occasion).1

First, our dear Shaykh grades the hadith of ‘Amr b. Maymun to be mursal. This means that there is no Sahabi in the chain. The last narrator transmitting directly from the Messenger of Allah, sallallahu ‘alaihi waalihi, is only a Tabi’i. Second, Shaykh Ibn Taymiyyah claims that it contains clear lies upon the Messenger of Allah, especially the statement that ‘Ali, ‘alaihi al-salam, was his khalifah. He also interprets “depart” in the hadith to mean “depart from Madinah”, rather than “depart from this world”. It would be appropriate to examine its full chain, context and texts in order to determine the validity of the Shaykh’s claims.

Hadith al-Khilafah has come in three sighahs (versions). The first sighah is documented by Imam Ibn Abi ‘Asim (d. 287 H). He records:

ثنا محمد بن المثنى، حدثنا يحي بن حماد، عن أبي عوانة، عن يحيى بن سليم أبي بلج عن عمرو بن ميمون، عن ابن عباس قال: قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم لعلي: أنت مني بمنزلة هارون من موسى إلا أنك لست نبيا وأنت خليفتي في كل مؤمن من بعدي

Muhammad b. al-Muthanna – Yahya b. Hammad – Abu ‘Awanah – Yahya b. Sulaym Abu Balj – ‘Amr b. Maymun – Ibn ‘Abbas: The Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, said to ‘Ali: “You are to me of the status of Harun to Musa, with the exception that you are not a prophet. And you are my khalifah over every believer after me.”2

Dr. al-Jawabirah says:

اسناده حسن. رجاله رجال الشيخين غير ابي‌ بلج واسمه يحيي بن سليم بن بلج، قال الحافظ: صدوق ربما اخطأ. وله شواهد

Its chain is hasan. Its narrators are narrators of the two Shaykhs, except Abu Balj, and his name is Yahya b. Sulaym b. Balj. Al-Hafiz said: “Saduq (very truthful), maybe he made mistakes.” There are witnesses for it (i.e. the hadith).”3

‘Allamah al-Albani (d. 1420 H), in his annotated version of Ibn Abi Asim’s Kitab al-Sunnah surprisingly added some new words in brackets:

ثنا محمد بن المثنى، حدثنا يحي بن حماد، عن أبي عوانة، عن يحيى بن سليم أبي بلج عن عمرو بن ميمون، عن ابن عباس قال: قال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم لعلي: أنت مني بمنزلة هارون من موسى إلا أنك لست نبيا [إنه لا ينبغي أن أذهب إلا] وأنت خليفتي في كل مؤمن من بعدي

Muhammad b. al-Muthanna – Yahya b. Hammad – Abu ‘Awanah – Yahya b. Sulaym Abu Balj – ‘Amr b. Maymun – Ibn ‘Abbas: The Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, said to ‘Ali: “You are to me of the status of Harun to Musa, with the exception that you are not a prophet. [Verily, it is not right that I depart except] with you as my khalifah over every believer after me.”4

Nonetheless, ‘Allamah al-Albani also comments:

إسناده حسن. ورجاله ثقات رجال الشيخين غير أبي بلج واسمه يحيى بن سليم بن بلج قال الحافظ: " صدوق ربما أخطأ ".

Its chain is hasan. Its narrators are trustworthy, and are narrators of the two Shaykhs (i.e. al-Bukhari and Muslim) except Abu Balj. His name is Yahya b. Sulaym b. Balj. Al-Hafiz said: “Saduq (very truthful), maybe he made mistakes.”5

This hadith, in the Sunni book, is narrated by Ibn ‘Abbas, radhiyallahu ‘anhu, a Sahabi. Therefore, it is not mursal, as claimed by Shaykh Ibn Taymiyyah. Rather, its chain is musnad (well-connected) and hasan (good). Moreover, since the hadith has been authentically transmitted, the Shaykh’s grading of it as “a lie” also has absolutely no basis at all.

The second sighah is recorded by Imam Ahmad b. Hanbal (d. 241 H), in his Musnad:

حدثنا عبد الله حدثني أبي ثنا يحيى بن حماد ثنا أبو عوانة ثنا أبو بلج ثنا عمرو بن ميمون ....قال بن عباس وخرج بالناس في غزوة تبوك قال فقال له علي أخرج معك قال فقال له نبي الله لا فبكى علي فقال له أما ترضى أن تكون منى بمنزلة هارون من موسى الا أنك لست بنبي انه لا ينبغي أن أذهب الا وأنت خليفتي

‘Abd Allah – my father (Ahmad b. Hanbal) – Yahya b. Hammad – Abu ‘Awanah – Abu Balj – ‘Amr b. Maymun Ibn ‘Abbas said:

.... He (the Messenger of Allah) went out for the battle of Tabuk. So, ‘Ali said to him, “Let me go out with you.” Therefore, the Prophet of Allah, peacebe upon him, said, “Do not weep, ‘Ali. Are you not pleased that you are to me of the status of Harun to Musa, with the exception that you are not a prophet? Verily, it is not right that I depart except with you as my khalifah.”6

Al-Arnaut strangely says:

إسناده ضعيف بهذه السياقة أبو بلج أعدل ما قيل فيه أنه يقبل حديثه فيما لاينفرد به

Its chain is dha’if with this context. Abu Balj, the fairest that has been said about him is that his hadith is accepted only when he is corroborated.7

However, he contradicts himself elsewhere:

حدثنا عبد الله حدثني أبي ثنا عفان ثنا أبو عوانة ثنا أبو بلج عن محمد بن حاطب.... إسناده حسن من أجل أبي بلج

‘Abd Allah – my father (Ahmad b. Hanbal) – ‘Affan – Abu ‘Awanah – Abu Balj – Muhammad b. Hatib Its chain is hasan due to Abu Balj.8

Al-Arnaut also states:

حدثنا عبد الله حدثني أبي ثنا حسن حدثنا زهير حدثنا أبو بلج ان عمرو بن ميمون حدثه قال قال أبو هريرة ....هذا إسناد حسن

‘Abd Allah – my father (Ahmad b. Hanbal) – Hasan – Zuhayr – Abu Balj – ‘Amr b. Maymun – Abu Hurayrah This chain is hasan.9

Apparently, Hadith al-Khilafah is hasan by the standards of Shaykh al-Arnaut too! Commenting about the same hadith in Musnad Ahmad, ‘Allamah Ahmad Shakir (d. 1377 H) declares:

إسناده صحيح، أبو بلج، بفتح الباء وسكون اللام و آخره جيم: اسمه يحيى بن سليم ويقال يحيى بن أبي الأسود الفزاري، وهو ثقة، وثقه ابن معين وابن سعد والنسائي والدارقطني وغيرهم. وفي التهذيب أن البخاري قال: فيه نظر! وما أدري أين قال هذا؟، فإنه ترجمه في الكبير 4/2/279 ـ 280 ولم يذكر فيه جرحاً، ولم يترجمه في الصغير، ولا ذكره هو والنسائي في الضعفاء، وقد روى عنه شعبة، وهو لا يروي إلا عن ثقه

Its chain is sahih. Abu Balj: his name is Yahya b. Sulaym. He is also called Yahya b. Abi al-Aswad al-Fazari, and he is thiqah (trustworthy). Ibn Ma’in, IbnSa’d , al-Nasai, al-Daraqutni and others declared him thiqah. It is said in al-Tahdhib that al-Bukhari said: “There is a problem in him”! I do not know: where has he said that? This is because in his (al-Bukhari’s) biography of him in al-Kabir 4/2/279-280, he does not mention any criticism against him, and he (al-Bukhari) does not write his biography in al-Saghir, and neither he nor al-Nasai has mentioned him in (his respective) al-Dhu’afa. Moreover, Shu’bah has narrated from him, and he does not narrate except from thiqah narrators.10

Imam al-Hakim (d. 403 H) records the hadith too:

أخبرنا أبو بكر أحمد بن جعفر بن حمدان القطيعي ببغداد من أصل كتابه ثنا عبد الله بن أحمد بن حنبل حدثني أبي ثنا يحيى بن حماد ثنا أبو عوانة ثنا أبو بلج ثنا عمرو بن ميمون ....قال ابن عباس :.... وقعوا في رجل له بضع عشرة فضائل ليست لأحد غيره.... وخرج رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم في غزوة تبوك وخرج بالناس معه قال فقال له علي : أخرج معك قال : فقال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم لا فبكى علي فقال له : أما ترضى أن تكون مني بمنزلة هارون من موسى إلا أنه ليس بعدي نبي إنه لا ينبغي أن أذهب إلا وأنت خليفتي

Abu Bakr Ahmad b. Ja’far b. Hamadan al-Qati’i – ‘Abd Allah b. Ahmad b. Hanbal – my father (Ahmad b. Hanbal) – Yahya b. Hammad – Abu ‘Awanah – Abu Balj – ‘Amr b. Maymun Ibn ‘Abbas said:

.... They are attacking a man who has ten EXCLUSIVE merits.... The Messenger of Allah, peace be upon him, went out for the battle of Tabuk, and the people went out with him. So, ‘Ali said to him, “Let me go out with you.” Therefore, the Prophet, peacebe upon him, said, “Do not weep, ‘Ali. Are you not pleased that you are to me of the status of Harun to Musa, with the exception that there is no prophet after me? Verily, it is not right that I depart except with you as my khalifah.”11

Al-Hakim says:

هذا حديث صحيح الإسناد

This hadith has a sahih chain.12

Al-Dhahabi (d. 748 H) backs him:

صحيح

Sahih.13

Meanwhile, Imam al-Nasai (d. 303 H) has documented the third sighah, through the same hasan chain of transmission as the first:

وخرج بالناس في غزوة تبوك فقال علي أخرج معك فقال لا فبكى فقال أما ترضى أن تكون مني بمنزلة هارون من موسى إلا أنك لست بنبي ثم قال أنت خليفتي يعني في كل مؤمن من بعدي

.... He (the Messenger of Allah) went out with the people for the battle of Tabuk. So, ‘Ali said to him, “Let me go out with you.” Therefore, he (the Prophet) said, “Do not weep, ‘Ali. Are you not pleased that you are to me of the status of Harun to Musa, with the exception that you are not a prophet? You are my khalifah, that is, over every believer after me.”14

This third sighah reveals that the second sighah actually misses some words. When the Messenger of Allah declared Amir al-Muminin as his khalifah, he explicitly explained what he meant, so that the khilafah is not confused with ‘Ali’s governorate over Madinah. In the end, all three sighahs actually say the same thing: ‘Ali was the khalifah of the Messenger of Allah over every believer after him.

These various reports record varying degrees of details of the text of Hadith al-Khilafah. However, by combining the sighahs, a clear picture emerges:

1. The Messenger of Allah made Amir al-Muminin his khalifah over Madinah during the battle of Tabuk.

2. The Prophet himself led the army to Tabuk.

3. ‘Ali was very distressed with the appointment and preferred to participate in the battle as a soldier. This displeasure made him weep.

4. His request to the Prophet to let him participate as a soldier in the battle was turned down.

5. To make him happy and pleased, the Prophet stated that he was exactly the Harun of this Ummah, except that while Harun was a prophet, he was not.

6. The Messenger of Allah also informed him that he would become his khalifah over his entire Ummah after him.15

7. The Prophet further added that it was not right for himself to depart except with ‘Ali being his khalifah over the entire Ummah after him.

8. Lastly, ‘Ali’s khilafah in the hadith is part of his ten exclusive merits, according to Ibn ‘Abbas.

Interestingly, Shaykh Ibn Taymiyyah seeks to capitalize on the fact that the hadith was delivered during ‘Ali’s khilafah over Madinah. He therefore restricts the khilafah in the hadith to mere governorate over a town or city within the Ummah. On that basis, he kicks it out:

فإن النبي صلى الله عليه و سلم ذهب غير مرة وخليفته على المدينة غير علي

Verily, the Prophet, peacebe upon him, departed many times and his khalifah over Madinah was other than ‘Ali (on each occasion).16

His submission however fails for two reasons. First, the Messenger wanted to tell ‘Ali something to make him happy, considering the latter’s deep distress over his appointment as governor of Madinah. How then would he have still mentioned that same governorate to cheer him up? Does that make any sense? Besides, the Prophet specifically indicated that the khilafah he was speaking about would be over the entire Ummah after him. This certainly is different from the governorate of Madinah, which was over a tiny portion of the Ummah while the Messenger of Allah was still alive! How on earth did our dear Shaykh miss this simple, clear difference?

As if the weird actions of Shaykh Ibn Taymiyyah on Hadith al-Khilafah are not enough, ‘Allamah al-Albani sinks even deeper:

أما ما يذكره الشيعة في هذا الحديث وغيره أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم قال في علي رضي الله عنه: " إنه خليفتي من بعدي ". فلا يصح بوجه من الوجوه، بل هو من أباطيلهم الكثيرة التي دل الواقع التاريخي على كذبها لأنه لو فرض أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم قاله، لوقع كما قال لأنه (وحي يوحى) والله سبحانه لا يخلف وعده

As for what the Shi’ah mention about this hadith and others that the Prophet, peace be upon him, said about ‘Ali,may Allah be pleased with him, that “he is my khalifah after me”, it is NOT authentic for many reasons. Rather, it is one of their (i.e. Shi’is’) several fabrications, which are exposed as lies by history. If truly the Prophet, peace be upon him, had said it, it would have occurred as predicted, because it is wahy revealed, and Allah never betrays His Promise.17

Has the ‘Allamah really forgotten that he has personally authenticated the chain of that hadith? Or, did he choose to become economical with truthfulness and sincerity after realizing that Hadith al-Khilafah simply cannot be twisted to kill its true meaning? It is rather unfortunate that ‘Allamah al-Albani plays this lowly “Ibn Taymiyyah” card despite his high calibre.

The only excuse he has actually tabled for attacking the hadith (despite his claim of the existence of many) is that it contradicts historical reality. Rather than ‘Ali, Abu Bakr became the khalifah. Therefore, ‘Ali could not have been the designated successor?! This reasoning further exposes another aspect of ‘Allamah al-Albani: his shocking ignorance of the meaning of the word khalifah! Does he even read the Qur’an at all?

Musa and Harun, ‘alaihima al-salam, were both messengers chosen by Allah:

فأتياه فقولا إنا رسولا ربك

So go you both to him and say: “Verily, we both are messengers of your Lord”18

By the Order of Allah, every messenger was a ruler of his people:

وما أرسلنا من رسول إلا ليطاع بإذن الله

We sent no messenger, but to be obeyed by Allah’s Leave.19

So, what happens when the people refuse to obey a messenger? Does he lose his status? By the reasoning system of ‘Allamah al-Albani, if Allah had truly appointed someone a messenger, then the people would certainly have obeyed him. If they did not obey him, then it must have been that he was not a genuine messenger!

Harun, apart from being a messenger, was also Musa’s khalifah over the latter’s entire Ummah:

وقال موسى لأخيه هارون اخلفني في قومي

Musa said to his brother, Harun: “Be my khalifah over my people.”20

But, what happened once Musa went away temporarily from his Ummah, with his brother as his khalifah over them? A rebel leader rose against Harun, and stole power. The people of Musa thereby disobeyed Harun and followed the rebel leader, named al-Samiri. Allah informed Musa of the situation while he was still absent from them:

قال فإنا قد فتنا قومك من بعدك وأضلهم السامري

He (Allah) said: “Verily! We have tried your people in your absence, and al-Samiri has led them astray.”21

The Qur’an continues:

ولما رجع موسى إلى قومه غضبان أسفا قال بئسما خلفتموني من بعدي أعجلتم أمر ربكم وألقى الألواح وأخذ برأس أخيه يجره إليه قال ابن أم إن القوم استضعفوني وكادوا يقتلونني

When Musa returned to his people, angry and grieved, he said, “What an evil thing is that which you have done during my absence! Did you hasten and go ahead as regards the matter of your Lord?” He threw down the Tablets and seized his brother by his head and dragged him towards him. Harun said, “O son of my mother! Indeed the people judged me weak, and were about to murder me.”22

In line with the logic of ‘Allamah al-Albani, since Allah announced Harun as a messenger, and Musa too called him his khalifah, then the Israelites must have obeyed him. Otherwise, the Promise of Allah would have failed!Moreover, because they disobeyed Harun and obeyed al-Samiri – in the thinking line of ‘Allamah al-Albani – the former was therefore no longer a messenger or a khalifah! Rather, al-Samiri became the true messenger and khalifah by staging a successful rebellion! How can a Muslim scholar reason like that?

Notes

1. Abu al-‘Abbas Ahmad b. ‘Abd al-Halim b. Taymiyyah al-Harrani, Minhaj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah (Muasassat Qurtubah; 1st edition, 1406 H) [annotator: Dr. Muhammad Rashad Salim], vol. 5, p. 34

2. Abu Bakr b. Abi ‘Asim, Ahmad b. ‘Amr b. al-Dhahhak b. Mukhlid al-Shaybani, Kitab al-Sunnah (Dar al-Sami’i li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi’) [annotator: Dr. Basim b. Faysal al-Jawabirah], vol. 1, pp. 799-800, # 1222

3. Ibid

4. Abu Bakr b. Abi ‘Asim, Ahmad b. ‘Amr b. al-Dhahhak b. Mukhlid al-Shaybani, Kitab al-Sunnah (al-Maktab al-Islami; 1st edition, 1400 H) [annotator: Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani], vol. 2, p. 565, # 1188

5. Ibid

6. Abu ‘Abd Allah Ahmad b. Hanbal al-Shaybani, Musnad (Cairo: Muasassat Qurtubah) [annotator: Shu’ayb al-Arnaut], vol. 1, p. 330, # 3062

7. Ibid

8. Ibid, vol. 4, p. 259, # 18305

9. Ibid, vol. 2, p. 355, # 8645

10. Abu ‘Abd Allah Ahmad b. Hanbal al-Shaybani, Musnad (Cairo: Dar al-Hadith; 1st edition, 1416 H) [annotator: Ahmad Muhammad Shakir], vol. 1, p. 331, # 3062

11. Abu ‘Abd Allah Muhammad b. ‘Abd Allah al-Hakim al-Naysaburi, al-Mustadrak ‘ala al-Sahihayn (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-’Ilmiyyah; 1st edition, 1411 H) [annotator: Mustafa ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Ata], vol. 3, p. 143, # 4652

12. Ibid

13. Ibid

14. Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman Ahmad b. Shu’ayb al-Nasai, Sunan al-Kubra (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah; 1st edition, 1411 H) [annotator: Dr. ‘Abd al-Ghaffar Sulayman al-Bandari and Sayyid Kasrawi Hasan], vol. 5, p. 112, # 8409

15. ‘Ali obviously was very passionate about serving Islam. This was why he preferred to be a soldier, rather than a governor. As a soldier, he believed that his contributions would be far greater. The Prophet then informed him that he was holding, and would also be holding, ranks and positions that would afford him unprecedented opportunities to serve Islam. This was to make him happy, and it did.

16. Abu al-‘Abbas Ahmad b. ‘Abd al-Halim b. Taymiyyah al-Harrani, Minhaj al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah (Muasassat Qurtubah; 1st edition, 1406 H) [annotator: Dr. Muhammad Rashad Salim], vol. 5, p. 34

17. Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Nasir al-Din b. al-Hajj Nuh b. Tajati b. Adam al-Ashqudri al-Albani, Silsilah al-Ahadith al-Sahihahwa Shayhun min Fiqhihah wa Fawaidihah (Riyadh: Maktabah al-Ma’arif li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi’; 1st edition, 1415 H), vol. 4, p. 344, # 1750

18. Qur’an 20:47

19. Qur’an 4:64

20. Qur’an 7:142

21. Qur’an 20:85

22. Qur’an 7:150