CHAPTER 23: THE PRINCIPLE OF OPTION (AŞĀLA AL-TAKHYĪR)
The position of principality of option is where the generic compulsion is known while it is not known whether that compulsion is obligation or unlawfulness. In such case, either both sides are instrumental or one side is religiously, the former having, in turn, happened in one occurrence or multiple occurrences. Thus, we should deal with the problem in the following separate state:
1. The case where both sides are instrumental, in one occurrence; like the case where one definitely knows that he has sworn but one is doubtful whether one has sworn to do a certain permissible affair in a specific time (to do that affair in that time becoming obligatory in such case) or not to do it in the same specific time (to do that affair in that time becoming unlawful, then). As the summary-fashioned knowledge cannot make the known affair incontrovertible, because of impossibility of precaution in such case due to impotence of the duty-bound against actualizing both probabilities, its existence becomes as non-existence as to making “the definite obedience” obligatory or “the definite opposition” unlawful (as will be explained in detail in chapter 24). On the other hand, “the probable obedience” is inevitable. Hence, the intellect judges that the duty-bound has the option to do or to eschew, in the sense that he has actually no choice other than that.
Thus, this is an existential, involuntary option and not an actual or apparent precept made by the divine lawgiver; for the latter would be acquiring what is already acquired - something impossible. However, there is a dispute whether (1.1.) such thing can have an apparent permissibility, (1.2.) proofs of clearance embrace that, (1.3.) the unlawfulness should be given priority, for repelling evil is prior to acquiring interest, or (1.4.) none of those is possible.
As for the apparent permissibility, it cannot be made, for the duty-bound is certain of its non-existence, since he definitely knows that there is a compulsion on the part of the Lord either to do or to eschew in such a way that permissibility, which is permission to both doing and abandoning, is impossible.
Inclusion in the clearance is also impossible, for the option judged by the intellect is prior to exercising clearance, since that intellectual option is due to the ineffectiveness of summary-fashioned knowledge and effectiveness of clearance is doubtlessly subsequent to the ineffectiveness of summaryfashioned knowledge.
The third probability is also nonsensical, for should such probability of evil cause unlawfulness, it would be more plausible to do that as to the primary dubiety inasmuch as there exists no probability of good, while in such cases clearance is doubtlessly effective.
Thus, it became clear that none of such probabilities is considerable and there is an intellectual option in such cases.
2. The case where both sides are instrumental but in multiple occurrences, like the case where one definitely knows that one has sworn, but he is doubtful whether one has sworn to do a certain permissible affair every Friday, for instance, or to avoid doing it every Friday. Here, since the summaryfashioned knowledge is effective as to making the definite opposition unlawful, one is not allowed to do that certain affair on one Friday and to eschew it on another. On the other hand, observing “the definite obedience” is impossible, as explained in the first case. The result, therefore, would be an intellectual primary option, meaning that one is allowed to choose at the beginning either of those two probabilities, but one must observe that choice constantly without any change in mind.
3. The case where both sides are religiously, or one certain side is so. Here, since the definite opposition is possible, by doing or eschewing with the intention of proximity to God, it is definitely unlawful. Therefore, one is not allowed to do without the intention of proximity to God where the mandatory act is religiously or eschew without the intention of proximity to God where the unlawful act is so. Rather, one must do or eschew in accordance with the probable obedience. The result is that the intellectual option in this case is conditional upon not necessitating the definite opposition.
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1. Should one side be more important where canons are definitely known, like when one wonders whether the animate thing one wishes to shoot is a human being whose killing is unlawful or an animal whose killing is permissible, one has no option anymore and should take the more important side into consideration. However, in cases where canons are not known in a definite way and the probability is not that strong to make the precaution necessary, one still has the option no matter how important one side seems.
2. In cases where following the way of precaution is not possible in one act but is possible by repeating the act, such as performing the prayers both completely and shortened, the summary-fashioned knowledge would become incontrovertible and the precaution and observing the definite obedience would be mandatory.