Chapter Ten: The Argument from Religious Experience
Religious Experience and Demonstrative Reasoning
Absence of ratiocination and weak fundamentals of philosophical thinking have led the Judeo-Christian theological tradition to some delirious admonitions and discourses, which are devoid of demonstrative tenability. Later, along the history of western philosophy, this set of demagoguery has invited a series of disorderly and confused pro and con debates.
Among the arguments, which lack philosophical and demonstrative form, is an argument, which has been called the argument from religious experience. It proceeds from the inward experiences, discoveries, and visions with respect to a reality, which has an intrinsic sanctity and value.[173]
Though rational argument supports the possibility of shuhūdi cognition of the reality of existence, nevertheless, two points have to be established here. First, shuhūd has several levels and it is only in its certain levels whereby certitude about the content of a given shuhūd can be held. Particular and convulsive(mutazalzil) shuhūds are not ascertaining even during the experience and vision. Second, though a person who is not familiar with shuhūdi experiences cannot establish a definite argument to reject or invalidate the shuhūds of a Gnostic, on the other hand, the Gnostic’s shuhūds cannot bring forth certitude for him either.
The only way that a person who has not been in the realm of shuhūd can gain knowledge and certitude regarding the content of another person’s shuhūd is to have convincing proof about its truth. Such proof is either established directly on the experienced reality such as the demonstrations for the existence of God, or through proving the infallibility of the individual who has experienced such shuhūds in the three stages of revelation, reception, and conveyance.
Some western theologians have suggested an argument for the existence of God on the grounds of religious experiences of individuals. This argument can be summed up as follows:
Experience in relation to a sacred and transcendent reality exists.
Such experiences are not the works of natural causes.
Therefore, a supernatural reality, which is God, exists.
Even if the skeptic agnostic who has not undergone any such inward experience overlooks what he views as the disputability of the first premise, the argument is still untenable because its second premise is evidently on shaky grounds, since according to some psychological theories, religious experience has been explained on purely natural accounts. For instance, they have been ascribed to the psychological and social factors, which cause other mental phenomena. Moreover, even if the veridicality of the second premise were laid aside unchallenged, the argument would only indicate a supernatural entity. However, whether this supernatural entity has unity or necessity of existence is wide open to question.
The fact of the matter is that religious experiences, simply because they are inward and conscious experiences, do not bring about any cognitive certitude(al-yaqīn al-‛ilmī) for the person who undergoes them or for others for that matter. In order to have certitude regarding the content and truth of one’s shuhūd, one must have “truth of certainty”[174] during his shuhūd; otherwise, after his shuhūd, he must rationally establish that his experience was not influenced by psychological factors and it really reflected reality.
Definite and Indefinite Shuhūds
Some people think that during the actual course of mystical or religious experiences, one cannot have doubts and doubts arise only after ecstasies cease and one returns to the realm of acquired knowledge. This is a false presumption.
Many shuhūds and mystical experiences are devoid of certitude and are coupled with doubt and uncertainty. This is similar to when you observe a group discussion in a dream and hear contradictory remarks; in this state, you analyze some of the remarks and experience doubt and uncertainty about them, and finally, you may be convinced of a different opinion.
Definite shuhūds are devoid of delirium and incoherence; they have immutability and universality. The universality of shuhūdi realities is not conceptual; rather, it is expansive. Therefore, shuhūdi certitude is attained by reaching intellectual(al-haqā’iq al-‛aqliyya) and meta-intellectual realities(al-haqā’iq fauq al-‛aqliyya) , not by accumulating concepts. The certitude secured from these realities is not psychological certitude, which might be regarded as a dyad of fantasy or surmise, and consequently, it would be justified to inquire whether this certitude is brought about by unscientific means. Such certitude is epistemic certitude. As factual external realities, the necessity of veridicality of shuhūdi realities encompasses the comprehension in a way that there remains no chance for doubt or uncertainty regarding them. Epistemic certitude - which is the necessity of veridicality as in the necessity of the basic reality, for instance - encompasses human comprehension in a way that it becomes impossible to doubt it. When a person encounters a necessity as such, he has no choice but to accept it.
Once the shuhūd of intellectual and meta-intellectual realities attained, one finds the infinite presence of these realities from every direction; and consequently, doubt and uncertainty becomes impossible.
Particular shuhūds, which take place in the inferior levels of existence and pertain to the natural world and the mundus imaginalis(‛ālam al-khiyāl) , due to the flux of their subjects, are subject to change; and due to their finitude, the faculties of imagination(khiyāl) and estimation(wahm) cause deceit and trickery and transfuse the qualities and effects of finite realities from one realm to the other. Thus, a reality that is witnessed in the mundus imaginalis(‛ālam al-khiyāl) is not reflected in the image that develops after the involvement of imagination and estimation, and therefore, the individual is overwhelmed by doubt and uncertainty.
If the wayfarer lets the star of reason illuminate his soul, the fooleries of imagination and estimation will be diminished; and then, imagination and estimation shall follow the command of reason and illustrate the realities of nature and mundus imaginalis as they are observed by intellects. Then, once again, the mundus imaginalis becomes commensurable to perception, and with the absence of nonconformity, doubt and skepticism are supplanted and light of certitude shines through to the lowest levels of shuhūd. At this state, at every direction that the Gnostic looks, he sees nothing but the Real, and he does not have the slightest doubt or skepticism about Him. The Master of the Monotheists and the Commander of the Faithful, Imam Ali, bliss be for him, says, “I have not doubted the Real, since I have seen Him.”[175]
Thus, skepticism, delirium, and disorientation can sometimes be found in the content of shuhūd as well and they cannot be avoided but through shuhūd of intellectual realities. If during the journey, the wayfarer finds the ability to communicate with intellectual realities or with people who have reached them, he discovers the falsity of experiences that are influenced by the fooleries of imagination and estimation and are rooted in his terrestrial and earthly past. This in turn facilitates his familiarity with realities of the mundus imaginalis(‛ālam al-khiyāl) . However, if he fails to achieve this benevolence, he strays in shuhūd, and in brief, he is a person astray in the state of shuhūd who cannot differentiate between the way and the non-way.
If there is any succor for such a person, it can be given only after cessation of the passion and after his emancipation from the evil of the Satan who dominates him. In this state, he can judge his experiences on the basis of rational concepts, which are attained from distant visions of intellectual realities, and gain certitude about that portion of his experience only which is supported by rational proof. This certitude, however, is not because of his mystical experiences, but rather owes to the rational proof, which authenticates its truth. He must reject experiences, which the rational approach attests to its falsity, and regard experiences that have neither been authenticated nor rejected by reason with doubt and uncertainty. Then, in the light of reason, should he succeed in discerning the necessity of the presence of Divine guidance in creation - that is, the necessity of prophethood - and furthermore, through miracles and the like, should he be successful in identifying its instantiation, he can also rely on the sayings of the prophets and their legatees. This will further enable him to exercise judgment with respect to those observations, which the rational arguments were incapable of authenticating. Thus, he can be certain of any shuhūd, which is in accordance with the authenticated and reliable traditions of the prophets and their successors, and thank and praise God for observing them, and rebuff any discovery, which is not compatible with the veracious sayings, and seek refuge with the Benevolent God from their evil.
Deviation from Rational Cognition and Decline into Open and Latent Skepticism
The evaluation of inner experiences through rational arguments, the Noble Qur’ān, and the traditions of the Infallibles, peace be with them, is feasible only for a person who trusts acquired knowledge, that is to say, he does not consider the affirmation of central religious doctrines, such as the existence of God, prophethood, the hereafter, and so forth, beyond the capacity of reason. But consider a person whose shuhūd does not reach the intellectual and meta-intellectual realities, when not in the state of shuhūd, he is not afforded acquired knowledge, whose conceptual cognition is limited to sensual perceptions, and what he considers knowledge is hypothesis and theories which are not only indemonstrable but cannot be definitely invalidated either, in short a person who is inflicted by open or disguised skepticism(shakkākiyya) . Even supposing such a person is having inward experiences, his experiences are devoid of cognitive worth and he has no criterion for their cognitive evaluation.
Such experiences, besides their nonconformity with each other and with the experiences of other people, are delirious and confused perceptions, which only provide hypotheses and theory-subjects for psychologists who can only regard them as objects of knowledge, not as a form of knowledge.
If a person receives an intimation in a dream or he thinks he is witnessing the visage of an infallible entity while awake, this mere exemplification cannot bring cognitive certitude. It is possible that visage has been exemplified by the foolery of his ego and assistance of Satan. As for the traditions stating that Satan does not appear in form of infallible entities, even supposing that such a person has affirmed monotheism and prophethood by acquired knowledge and has paved the way for himself to receive guidance from the infallibles, these traditions do not provide him with sufficient grounds to argue for the validity of his experience. As Mulla Muhsin al-Faydh al-Kāshānī says in his Al-Mahajja al-Baydhā’, if a person has not seen God’s chosen servants, Satan can falsely attribute to the Benevolent Prophet or his successors an image the appearance of which has been occasioned by his ego. If Satan is able to attribute an image or statement to God or His Prophet at the hands of forfeiters of traditions in wakefulness, is he unable to accomplish that in stupor?
In short, the inner experiences of people who do not have intellectual and meta-intellectual shuhūd have no cognitive worth. Therefore, central religious tenets such as the existence of God and His names of beauty cannot be based on such uncertain grounds. It is only if the person trusts the conceptual format of knowledge that he can evaluate these experiences through the criterion of reason. Therefore, inner experiences, which are not substantiated by reason, are devoid of any cognitive reflection about reality. If such experiences have any reflection at all, it is of the sort of narration that any natural phenomenon would have about its causes. Such experiences are like nightmares, which reflect the psychological conditions and past deeds of individuals. Therefore, such experiences are rather more useful to psychologists who study phenomena like the causes and nature of nightmares.
Indeed, the inner experiences of such people do have another sort of reflection regarding their efficient causes. Nonetheless, their sound interpretation is solely in the capacity of people who are aware of the clandestine mysteries of the worlds, recognize the manifestations of the Divine beauties and majesties, know the stages of Paradise and Hell, and identify the signs of benevolence and wrath of the Benevolent and Avenging God.